What is transcendental apperception? Or the transcendental unity of apperception?.

Kant’s transcendental apperception principle in the Transcendental Deduction plays an important role in his epistemology. It serves as one of the crucial links between our subjective standpoint and the external, phenomenal reality. Having provided a descriptive account of the twelve categories in the Metaphysical Deduction, in the Transcendental Deduction Kant wants to prove that there is a hylomorphism between the categories and my perceptions of objects. That is, all of my cognitions of perceptual objects are necessarily schematized by the twelve categories. He proves this by appealing to the concept of transcendental apperception and arguing that: categories apply to my self-apperception, and my self-apperception accompanies all my representations; therefore, categories necessarily apply to all my representations. The key to this proof is the idea of transcendental unity of apperception. What is transcendental apperception? How is it a unity? What role does transcendental apperception play in our forming cognitions? I will answer these three questions in this essay. My explanation goes in the following order: first, I will show that the unity of perceptual objects in our cognitions implies the unity of self; second, I will explain that this unity of self is only possible because of our spontaneous synthesis; third and finally, I will demonstrate that all representations being mine are necessarily schematized by the twelve categories.

Kant’s reasoning in the Transcendental Deduction begins with the assumption that perceptual objects, namely, representations, are given in my consciousness as unified entities. This is taken as an empirical fact. Kant then introduces the idea of transcendental apperception in the opening of section 16 in the Transcendental Deduction, and he establishes a necessary relation between my representations and the apperception principle. He states:

The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me. (B131-2)

What Kant wants to demonstrate here is, whenever we have a thought of something, in order to claim the representation to be mine, there has to be an implicit awareness of “I think.” To put it in more precise terms, when I think of “p,” there is always the possible reflective knowledge of “I think p.” “I think,” therefore, is the conscious articulation of the self-awareness of I am thinking p, although it is not necessarily expressed every time I cognize an object. Commentators have different opinions on whether “I think” must always accompany all my representations or if it is merely a reflective possibility of recognizing “I am thinking” (Klass, 89). But let us not probe into this problem, for it does not hinder the progression of Kant’s argument. Instead, let us observe the fact that “I think must be able to accompany all my representations” denotes the ascription of a representation to I, the self. This relation cannot be denied despite the different interpretations of the role of “I think” in Kant’s cognition theory. Kant uses apperception to mean self-awareness, expressed through the “I think.” Apperception is the awareness of the self of having a representation, and it must necessarily accompany all my representations.

However, Longuenesse in her article “Kant’s ‘I Think’ versus Descartes’ ‘I Am a Thing That Thinks’” takes “I think” to be more implicit than the possible reflective knowledge of “I think p.” She understands it to be the indication of the function of my synthesis at work. She explains that: “what [Kant] means is that in order to be mine, a representation must be taken up in such a process of combination and comparison, which… is also the process in virtue of which the object of the representation is recognizable under a concept, or thought” (Longuenesse, 15). In other words, objects would not become representations in my consciousness unless they are already structured by me. Instead of the possible reflective awareness of it is I who is thinking p, “I think” here serves as an awareness of the product of the spontaneous synthesis that has to necessarily take place before my cognition of representations. In Longuenesse’s words, apperception refers to the self-awareness of the self as an agent who commits himself to formulate a consistent and coherent standpoint through which the agent forms his thoughts. “I think” is the active synthesis that I perform in order to create my representations in my consciousness. It is directly this synthesis instead of the indirect, reflective ascription of the representation to me. This interpretation emphasizes the role of synthesis in forming my representations and sets aside the question of the identity of the bearer of unity “I:” “It matters not at all what kind of entity is the bearer of the act whose peculiar kind of unity is expressed by the thought ‘I think’” (Longuenesse, 17). The unity of apperception here plays the role of combining and comparing, but it does not function as anything more than that. In my following interpretation of Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception, we will see that the identity of the “I” is an important element in forming our representation. It not only indicates the direct work of synthesis - that the representation being mine is the result of synthesis - but it also shows that the unity of self is the fundamental unity which the unity of objects depends on. However, let us first return to Kant’s reasoning below.

Having established a necessary relation between my representations and the self through apperception, Kant deducts that there is a unity of self given the unity of perceptual objects. This is because the “I think” is attached to my intuitions. That is, the manifold of intuitions can only be mine if it is ascribed to a self. Similar to the statement “I think must accompany all my representations,” “I think” also must accompany all my intuitions. Now, since we cognize perceptual objects as unified representations in our minds, and manifold of intuitions are single, directly referred entities, it must be that the self is unified in order to serve as the ground for the unity of objects. For if the self is not unified, the “I” in “I think” would be fragmented selves at particular moments of time, and intuitions, attaching to the separated, individual self, cannot be combined together to form a unity and become our representations. We would not have cognitions of perceptual objects at all. This contradiction proves that the self is a unified entity. From the unity of objects Kant deducts the unity of self.

Having demonstrated the unity of self, let us turn to the next question: how does the unity of self come about? We will see that the answer to this question lies in the notion of self-awareness or transcendental unity of apperception, and it plays an indispensable role in establishing Kant’s next claim - objects are necessarily synthesized by me. According to Kant, self-awareness refers to my awareness of the self as a numerically identical “I.” That is, to be self-aware is to recognize that it is the same “I” that cognize different representations, and the “I” is the self. In particular, Kant argues, given the particularity and singularity of time as a pure sensibility of intuition, the self is given as individual entities at one moment of time. They are separated and do not yet form the self. The notion of self arises when the self realizes that the different selves at moments of time belong to the same self. The self becomes self-aware when there is an awareness that it itself is the same subject throughout the changes of time and a recognition that it is the bearer of the unity. Such awareness and recognition require a synthesis and combination of the individual selves at moments of time. Therefore, our self-apperception indicates the work of synthesis and combination of our individual selves and proves that we are the active agents who spontaneously synthesize. Kant calls this self-activity of synthesis the unity of apperception. It is an activity of the self in the faculty of understanding, for “it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility” since sensibility does not entail unity (B132). The unity of apperception is hence given by the application of the pure concepts of understanding. That is, the twelve categories apply to my self-apperception.

Self-apperception, for Kant, is both synthetic and analytic. It is synthetic because it synthesizes the individual selves into a unity, thereby giving the notion the unity of apperception. However, it is also analytic as Kant declares: “Now this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is, to be sure, itself identical, thus an analytical proposition, yet it declares as necessary a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition.” (B135). What this means is that the “I” in the statement “I think” must be a unified identical self in order to recognize multiple different representations as mine. These representations would not be mine if they do not belong to the numerical identical self. The unity of self is already contained in the proposition “I think.”

Kant calls the unity of apperception to be transcendental for it is a priori. The unity of apperception is a priori because of two reasons. First, our self-apperception is not empirical knowledge. We do not empirically induct that the self is a numerical identical I. On the contrary, the self as the unified identical I is the necessary condition for all empirical cognitions. Second, the unity of apperception is regarded as the most universal form of unity and it is the condition for all other unities. Kant states, “I also call its unity the transcendental unity of self-consciousness in order to designate the possibility of a priori cognition from it” (B132). In Jonathan Bennett’s translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, he explains that there three levels of unity to be distinguished: the subjective unity of consciousness, the objective unity of consciousness, and the empirical unity of self-awareness and self-consciousness (Bennett, 79). The unity of apperception is the subjective unity of consciousness where representations are ascribed to the unified identical I. The objective unity of consciousness is the result of synthesizing representations into one object. The empirical unity of self-awareness is the reflective knowledge of self being one. The objective unity of consciousness and the empirical unity of self-awareness are dependent upon the subjective unity of consciousness, for I cannot think of a unified object or myself unless they have been brought together as mine. The unity of apperception is therefore transcendental, and it serves as the unifying standpoint where the unity of objects can arise.

From the discussion above, we have seen that 1. the self performs the activity of synthesis to give rise to the unity of apperception; 2. the unity of apperception is proved to be a necessary condition for the unity of objects. Kant’s next step is to apply the activity of synthesis of the self to explain the unity of objects. He argues that representations can be my representations because I synthesize and combine them. In other words, representations can be cognized by me is because first, they are related to the numerical identical self; second, they are synthesized by the self in order to be cognized. Kant explains, since “I think” accompanies all my representations, every representation is necessarily related to the “I” in “I think.” That is, if I am aware of the representations in my consciousness, then the representations must belong to the numerical identical I and have the unity of apperception. These representations are related to one self and they subsist in one mind. This proves the first point. Regarding the second point, Kant states:

The thought that these representations given in intuition all together belong to me means, accordingly, the same as that I united them in a self-consciousness, or at least can unite them therein… only because I can comprehend their manifold in a consciousness do I call them all together my representations (B134).

Here, Kant asserts that the ability of synthesis is the necessary condition for our cognition of objects. That is, we can only recognize representations as mine if I perform the act of synthesis. Kant further wants to claim that the cognition of objects equals the awareness of the synthesis, and he offers an explanation of this claim through another aspect of the Transcendental Deduction, which is the objective deduction.

According to Kant, our representations consist of intuitions and concepts, and intuitions are singular and directly referred. Therefore, intuitions do not give rise to the unity of objects. There must be a synthesis and combination of the manifold of intuitions to form a coherent reference to an object. This coherence, Kant explains, cannot be given in objects themselves, for manifold of representations can be only given as intuitions from the outside, and intuitions are singular. The unity must be a result of our own synthesis, which is proven to exist in the transcendental unity of apperception. Kant indicates: “we can represent nothing as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves” and “combination… can be executed only by the subject itself, since it is an act of its self-activity” (B130). That is, the self must bring the unity of manifold of intuitions about in order to cognize it as a representation. But since intuitions do not play a part in forming the unity of objects, concepts must be involved and employed by the self to bring the unity of objects about. Moreover, since concepts condition representations only through the pure concepts of understanding, the twelve categories must necessarily apply to all of our representations. This concludes Kant’s objective deduction and demonstrates that the unity of objects must require a synthesizing activity of the self, and this synthesis of the representations must be given through the categories.

Let us conclude what we have demonstrated so far. We have shown that Kant takes the unity of objects as a given empirical fact and deducts the unity of self being a necessary presupposition for the unity of objects. He then defines the unity of self to be a product of our self-activity of synthesis, combining individual selves at particular moments of time to give rise to the numerical identical self. He applies the synthesis shown in the unity of apperception and concludes that given that objects are related to the unity of apperception, and objects themselves do not present us the unity, it must be the “I” who synthesize and combine different representations together to formulate my cognition of objects. In this argument, the “I” serves as the fundamental unity - the subjective unity of consciousness - which allows the objective unity of consciousness to come about. Therefore, the unity of apperception is transcendental for it is a priori; it is synthetic since it functions as a synthesis principle. The transcendental unity of apperception, expressed as the “I” in “I think,” therefore grants the fact that all my representations, being mine, are schematized by the categories.

Bibliography

Longuenesse, Beatrice. “Kant’s “I think” versus Descartes’ “I am a thing that thinks.”

Klass, Gregory. "A Framework for Reading Kant on Apperception: Seven Interpretive Questions." Kant-Studien, vol. 94, pp. 80-94, 2003